Trading activity on social trading platforms – a behavioral approach by Dorfleitner, Gregor & Scheckenbach, Isabel
Journal of Risk Finance
Trading activity on social trading platforms – a behavioral 
approach
Journal: Journal of Risk Finance
Manuscript ID JRF-11-2020-0230.R1
Manuscript Type: Applied Research Paper
Keywords: Social trading platforms, Overconfidence, Social interaction, Individual trading behavior, Behavioral Finance
 
Note: The following files were submitted by the author for peer review, but cannot be converted to PDF. 
 You must view these files (e.g. movies) online.
20210623_OverconfidenceonSTPS_JRF_Resubmission_blinded.tex
Journal of Risk Finance
Journal of Risk Finance
Trading activity on social trading platforms – a behavioral approach∗
Wednesday 23rd June, 2021
Abstract
Social trading platforms are considered to be amongst the major innovations in online trading. The
purpose of this article is to analyze the trading activity of traders on social trading networks by taking
a behavioral approach. We investigate the factors that influence the irrational part of trading activity
derived from the key characteristics of these platforms, i.e. those dealing with social interaction. Our
investigation utilizes an extensive set of trading data from two major platforms in Germany to study the
trading behavior. We apply a fixed effects two-stage least squares approach to quantify the relationship
between trading activity and performance and define overconfidence as the part of trading activity that
is irrationally motivated and results in negative returns. Our results provide evidence for the negative
relationship between overconfidence and return on social trading platforms. The article finds that the
number of followers and some platform-specific features significantly affect the trading behavior of the
traders. We contribute to literature by exploring how the novel social interaction characteristics of
online trading impact trading activity by giving rise to a new dimension of overconfidence. In addition,
we evidence that the different frameworks of the platforms motivate heterogenous behavioral responses
by the signalers. Finally, we refine existing studies by applying a distinct methodology for modeling
overconfidence.
JEL classification: G14 · G20 · G41
Keywords: Social trading platforms, overconfidence, social interaction, individual trading
behavior, behavioral finance
1 Introduction
Social trading is considered to be one of the major innovations in online trading. Since 2007 an increasing
number of platforms offering social trading services has entered the market. These platforms incorporate
social network characteristics in online trading. They distinguish themselves from classic trading by
providing the possibility of so-called mirror trading, which allows users to copy and automatically execute
investment strategies of other traders, referred to as signalers, signal providers or trade leaders. This
feature adds a new perspective to the classic principal-agent relationship between investors (followers)
and fund managers (signalers), as investors can follow their trade leaders and monitor the performances of
these in real-time. Information transparency, reduced costs for users and the participation of professionals
and media companies have led to an increased level of acceptance of social trading (Glaser and Risius,
2016; Dorfleitner et al., 2017). Social trading, hence, created a new type of market place that adds a
new facet to trading by enabling social interaction between signalers and followers for example through
∗Our research was not supported by any foundations.
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Journal of Risk Finance
the communication of trading strategies and the possibility of rating the signalers. This social dimension
implies a novel set of determinants of trading behavior. In this paper we study whether trade leaders on
two leading social trading platforms in Germany are affected by the social network aspects and exhibit a
behavioral bias known as overconfidence. In particular, we investigate the irrational factors that influence
trading activity derived from the social network characteristics of these platforms, i.e. the number of
followers as well as the rating and compensation framework.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we add to the existing literature by investigating the
influence of social network features on the trading behavior of signal providers on social trading platforms.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explore how these novel social interaction characteristics
of online trading impact trading activity by giving rise to a new dimension of overconfidence. Second, by
assessing two heterogenous platforms we generate new insights into the influence of the platform design
on individual behavior.
Social trading platforms have aroused researchers’ interest as they provide accessibility of an extensive
amount of information and trading data to their users. Due to the fact that social interaction can be
observed in real-time, they constitute a valuable environment for studying investor behavior. The hitherto
best researched platform is eToro, which is also the global market leader. Empirical studies of eToro find,
on average, negative returns between 2010 and 2012 (Pan et al., 2012). Dorfleitner et al. (2018) provide
empirical evidence showing that only complex trading strategies tailored to platform characteristics are able
to provide positive returns (see also Oehler et al., 2016). According to Neumann (2014), the disposition
and loss aversion effect explain the return characteristics of social trading returns (see also Liu et al.,
2014; Heimer, 2016). Glaser and Risius (2016) observe that the trader’s exposure to the disposition effect
depends on behavioral and interaction features (see also Pelster and Hofmann, 2017). Contrary to this,
Gemayel (2016) indicates that improved information transparency weakens the disposition effect (see also
Lukas et al., 2017).
Pan et al. (2012) and Gemayel (2016) provide evidence for a certain level of wisdom of the crowd regarding
the followers selecting the right signalers and for a herding behavior of signalers with respect to replicating
the strategies of their competitors. Pan et al. (2012) show that investors are influenced by social dynamics
such as the number of followers and do not select trade leaders rationally based on performance indicators
(see also Röder and Walter, 2019; Kromidha and Li, 2019). Lee and Ma (2015) establish a model to
help investors improve the selection of signalers.Wohlgemuth et al. (2016) indicate that both the affect-
based and cognition-based signals raise the probability of followers copying their strategies. Ammann
and Schaub (2016) find that superior past performance induces increased, positive communication, which,
in turn, attracts followers. We extend the findings of Dorfleitner et al. (2018) regarding the negative
relationship between high trading activity and social trading returns by analyzing the factors that motivate
the irrational part of trading activity of signalers. This article contributes to the stream of literature
on overconfidence in a social setting (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002; Pentland, 2013; Proeger and Meub,
2014). Contrary to Proeger and Meub (2014), our study is based on actual trading data from two trading
platforms. We emphasize the importance of the platform design and the followers for the behavior of trade
leaders.
We apply a two-stage least squares model to overcome the endogeneity of trading activity and to quantify
the relationship between trading activity and performance. To this end, we implement an instrumental
variable approach endogenizing the trading volume in the first stage. We define overconfidence as the part
of trading activity that is irrationally motivated and results in negative returns. Our investigation utilizes
an extensive set of trading data from the platforms Ayondo and Wikifolio to study the trading behavior
of trade leaders in the observation period from October 2015 to May 2016.
The empirical analysis of the trading activity of signalers on social trading platforms provides new insights.
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First, we find that overconfident traders on social trading platforms impair their performance through
excessive trading, which is consistent with prior research. Second, we show that the social network aspects
of these platforms, in particular the number of followers and the ranking of the traders, exhibit a positive
relationship with the degree of overconfidence. Third, our findings suggest that the specific incentive
schemes of the platforms have diverse impacts. While the incentive scheme on Ayondo includes means
that appear to reduce the degree of overconfidence, the Wikifolio reward system does not reveal such an
effect. Consequently, our results are not only relevant for traders and investors but also for the operators
of social trading platforms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: First, we provide a description of social trading
platforms. Building on related literature we derive the hypotheses followed by a description of the data.
We subsequently outline our empirical approach in the Section 4. We present the results, analyze the
differences across the platforms and discuss their theoretical and practical implications in the Section 5.
Section 6 concludes and identifies areas for further research.
2 Description of the social trading platforms utilized in the analysis
As digitization and social media have entered the financial sector and affected traditional business models,
so-called fintechs have arisen providing financial services through the application of modern technology
(Mackenzie, 2015; Dorfleitner et al., 2017). Social trading platforms combine classic online trading tools
with the features of social networks (Neumann, 2014). The design of the platforms enables investors to
communicate with each other and to contemplate, scrutinize and copy investment strategies of traders in
the network (Pentland, 2013; Liu et al., 2014; Dorfleitner et al., 2017; Gemayel, 2016). The replication
of trades in real-time is the distinguishing feature of social trading and provides individuals with the
opportunity to profit from more proficient traders, who are compensated for sharing their investment
ideas based on performance fees (Pentland, 2013; Doering et al., 2015; Ammann and Schaub, 2016).
Although followers do not transfer capital to the signal provider’s accounts, the latter de facto act as
portfolio managers (Doering et al., 2015, p. 1). Profile pages of signalers display information on the
trading strategy, key figures on risk and performance, and social media characteristics such as the number
of followers and the ranking (Lee and Ma, 2015; Ammann and Schaub, 2016). Social trading platforms
monitor signalers and, depending on the business model, charge users fees, for example spreads or order
costs (Neumann, 2014; Doering et al., 2015; Dorfleitner et al., 2017).
This study focuses on Ayondo and Wikifolio since both only allow followers mirror trading and do not
provide the option to copy single trades. Both platforms attract heterogenous types of traders based on the
differences in the platform design. OnWikifolio, trade leaders (private and professional investors and media
companies1) create trading strategies by choosing from an investment universe of more than 250,000 shares,
exchange traded products, and leveraged products in order to profit from the price development of foreign
exchange or commodities (Wikifolio, 2016). After meeting certain criteria, these so-called wikifolios become
tradable as open-ended index certificates (Dorfleitner et al., 2018). Followers can thereby participate
in the performance of the wikifolio (Wikifolio, 2016). Signalers on Ayondo implement their strategies
by trading with contracts for difference (CFDs). Buyers of CFDs trade on margins and participate in
the changes of the value of the underlying disproportionally (Neumann, 2014). Investors are given the
opportunity to invest in up to five traders via CFDs (Ayondo, 2016). Leveraged products especially find
favor with social trading because they facilitate the execution of mirror trading (Doering et al., 2015;
Dorfleitner et al., 2017). The high flexibility in terms of contract sizes allows for a fractional mapping
1Media companies and financial market magazines such as Börse Online or AnlegerPlus publish their trading strategies
on Wikifolio.
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and ensures an exact proportionality between the signal provider’s and followers’ accounts (Doering et al.,
2015, p.7). While traders on Ayondo can only publish one trading strategy each, signalers on Wikifolio
can open several wikifolios. Wikifolio applies a high-water mark (HWM) remuneration scheme, whereas
Ayondo compensates its signalers based on the created trading volume and their rating contingent on risk-
adjusted performance (Doering et al., 2015). The composition of the ranking constitutes one of the major
differences between the platforms. On Ayondo five different career levels (Level) are available, which also
serve as the basis for the signaler’s compensation. The criteria for promotion comprise trading activity
and performance figures. To mitigate excessive risk taking, the maximum drawdown (MDD) is set to
25% on every level, leading to a demotion from the current level to the basic level in case of exceeding
the limit and making promotions in the future impossible (Ayondo, 2016). Wikifolio pursues a different
approach and ranks its traders based on Wikifolio points that are calculated on a daily basis conditioned
to risk, activity, performance, and capital criteria (Wikifolio, 2016). As the HWM compensation principle
is already implemented to minimize agency problems, the ranking mechanism appears to be less stringent,
allowing signalers to move up and down in the grading scale at any given time.
3 Theory and hypotheses
In the following, we build on the existing literature to derive three hypotheses regarding the factors
influencing trading behavior on social trading platforms. Hereby, we also account for the different rating
and incentivizing features of Ayondo and Wikifolio.
Platform design and expectable rational trading behavior A rational signal provider can be
characterized by a behavior that maximizes their profits. The compensation strategies of both platforms
consist of different elements, which can influence trading behavior. In the case of Ayondo, the trade
leader’s profits depend directly on the trading volume accountable to him or her, which is created by the
number of followers and the degree of his or her trading intensity. This quantity is multiplied by his or
her respective level, ranging from 1 to 5 and representing the rating of the trader by Ayondo (Ayondo,
2016). By linking compensation to trading volume, signalers are provided with the incentive to trade in
any situation, but with different levels of intensity. At the start of their careers, signalers attempt to
establish a sound track record aimed at attracting followers, while not having much to lose. Consequently,
signalers will be enticed into trading more, given a smaller number of followers and a lower level (Neumann,
2014). If a signaler advances in the rating system and more followers copy his or her strategy, the signal
provider will be able to adapt his or her behavior by reducing his or her trading intensity as he or she
profits proportionally from the more followers and the higher level. Higher l vels, though, entail the risk
of losing more, as the expulsion from the current level to the entry level has strong adverse effects on
the rating (due to the irreversibility of the drop) and number of investors. This risk is amplified by the
limitation of publishing only one trading strategy. Finally, there is a greater probability of being relegated
from the current level due to not meeting the performance criteria because increased trading activity
scales down returns by means of transactions costs (Dorfleitner et al., 2018). The strict requirements of
the ranking system regarding the maximum drawdown and the risk-adjusted performance support this
expected behavior.
There are several major differences on the Wikifolio platform. First, trade leaders receive a performance
premium, that partially depends on the capital invested in the signaler’s strategy, but only in the case
that a new HWM is achieved (Wikifolio, 2016). The option-like character of this compensation can –
depending on the time horizon of the trader – induce traders to undertake more risky projects in order
to increase the probability of achieving the HWM (Carpenter, 2000; Panageas and Westerfield, 2009).
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Due to the fact that a minimum of 10,000 EUR must be invested in the wikifolio certificate in order to
become eligible for remuneration, signalers can be expected to behave similarly to traders on Ayondo in
their early career stage, by seeking the attraction of followers. Once they have an investable portfolio,
trade leaders focus rationally on their performance in order to surpass the HWM while aiming at growing
capital inflows, which will, in turn, increase their profits. Contrary to Ayondo, neither trading activity
nor the rating have a direct impact on the profits of a signal provider. Trading volume, though, partly
affects the quantity of Wikifolio points. There is no general incentive to trade more or less in the case of
having acquired a certain level of Wikifolio points and following capital. Trade leaders are expected to
rationally maintain their trading intensity when moving up in the Wikifolio score, and to exhibit higher
levels of volatility. The lack of strict risk and maximum drawdown requirements as well as of penalties in
the event of not meeting these criteria supports this expected behavior. Finally, the anticipated behavior
of traders, which is similar to that of option holders, is further amplified by the possibility of opening
several wikifolios. Signalers are assumed to pursue various trading strategies with different levels of risk
until they have created one wikifolio with a broad investor base and good performance. Summarizing,
unlike on Ayondo there is no mechanism that incentivizes the traders to trade more on lower promotion
levels and to trade less on higher ones.
Popularity and the signaler’s trading behavior Thus far, behavioral finance studies have concen-
trated on the behavior of investors. However, social interaction can alter the traders’ conduct as investors
learn through observing the behavior of others (Barber and Odean, 2001b; Baker and Nofsinger, 2002;
Duflo and Saez, 2002; Seasholes, 2010; Hirshleifer, 2015). The social network features on both platforms
give rise to new aspects of social interaction in trading, which have the ability to influence overconfidence.
These include, among others, the number of followers that presents an indicator for the popularity of
signalers. Kim and Lee (2011) provide proof of the fact that the number of friends on Facebook serves
as an affirmation and boost of self-worth. The endeavor to be positively perceived by others can induce
overconfidence (Dowling and Lucey, 2010; Burks et al., 2013). Pentland (2013) shows that the confidence
of individuals increases when they realize that others pursue strategies akin to their investment ideas. He
elaborates by stating that, in the case of limited sources of information, traders consequently face the
risk of becoming overconfident. Individuals who are contingent upon self-serving attribution bias, tend to
credit past success to their skills and in doing so become more overconfident (Barber and Odean, 2001a;
Gervais and Odean, 2001; Hirshleifer, 2001; Puetz and Ruenzi, 2011; Hirshleifer, 2015). As a trade leader
cannot directly influence the number of followers or capital invested in his or her trading strategy, the
success of the trade leader is partly measured by the ability to entice followers (Doering et al., 2015).
Rational signalers who consider the mutual impacts on their profits would, given a certain number of fol-
lowers, behave in a way as to maintain their performance level and the number of followers. However, all
considered, we hypothesize that the popularity of a signaler’s strategy is perc ived as being a confirmation
of his or her skills and thus connected with his or her tendency to trade more. Such a type of irrational
behavior is a clear indication of (more) overconfidence.
Hypothesis 1 The popularity of a trading strategy among followers is positively related with increased
trading activity.
Overconfidence and a trader’s return Extensive research has been conducted into the relationship
between trading activity and performance. Contrary to rational traders, the overconfident overestimate
their expected gains and, hence, trade excessively, resulting in diminished returns compared with bench-
marks (Bondt and Thaler, 1995; Daniel et al., 1998; Barber and Odean, 2000; Glaser and Weber, 2007;
Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009). Increased transaction costs for inordinate trading and the lower pro-
ficiency levels of the traders can therefore explain the reduced returns of overconfident traders (Barber
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and Odean, 1999; Shefrin, 2002; Merkle and Weber, 2011; Hirshleifer, 2015). Barber and Odean (2002)
show that this relationship is particularly prevalent in online trading due to mitigated market frictions.
The enhanced availability of information even augments overconfidence by contributing to the illusion of
knowledge and control (Barber and Odean, 2001b; Baker and Nofsinger, 2002; Tsai et al., 2008; Abreu
and Mendes, 2012). In the case of Ayondo and Wikifolio, one could argue that the increased trading
activity is fostered through the setup of the platforms’ compensation rather than being a sign of overcon-
fidence. However, rational trade leaders will take into account that excessive trading entailing negative
performance can lead to the loss of followers, capital and rating, and, ultimately, profits. What is more,
technical aspects such as the trading strategy or the portfolio composition account for a certain level of
trading activity.2 In addition, trade leaders may see their trading activity as an opportunity to signal
their competency and trustworthiness and, hence, adjust their trading behavior accordingly (Burks et al.,
2013; Proeger and Meub, 2014; Wohlgemuth et al., 2016). With knowledge of the implied transaction
costs, this rational signaling strategy should still be profitable, though. Consequently, taking into account
all rational factors, we argue that excessive trading activity which is stimulated by irrational factors e.g.
increased popularity is connected with negative returns (after transaction costs).
Hypothesis 2 The increased trading activity due to higher popularity reduces a trader’s return.
Our second hypothesis is, hence, contingent on the first hypothesis. Consequently, only if we find evidence
for both hypotheses we have a clear indication of overconfidence, since we define overconfidence as the
part of trading activity induced by irrational factors and resulting in negative returns.
Influence of the platform-specific rating and incentivizing methodologies Since social trading
platforms prominently display the rating of each signaler, trade leaders strive for good positions in the
platform’s league table in order to attract new investments (Cheng, 2007; Jin et al., 2016; Gortner and
van der Weele, 2019). Both platforms under review reinforce this behavior by suggesting the ranking
as one of the key investment criterion, with the result that the predefined search for portfolios in the
investigation period has been based on levels and Wikifolio points respectively. A more elaborate analysis
of the investment opportunities taking into account risk and performance measures requires additional
efforts by the followers. Dowling and Lucey (2010) show that ambitious settings fostering competition
among individuals nurture a biased self-attribution (see also Eshraghi and Taffler, 2012; Simon and Heimer,
2015). The social ranking theory contributes by explaining in which way good performances compared
with the social environment nourish the signaler’s self-perception and result in higher confidence and risk
taking (Gilbert et al., 1996; Baker and Nofsinger, 2002). While several studies argue that the scarcity
of information in competitive fields augments overconfidence, the immediate feedback on social trading
platforms can reduce biased self-attribution as true abilities are revealed (Jin et al., 2016; Heimer, 2016;
Gortner and van der Weele, 2019). Moreover, changes in the rating of signalers can be regarded as being
a mechanism to supervise signalers and minimize the probability of adverse selection (Neumann, 2014;
Glaser and Risius, 2016). In general, we expect that a positive rating (higher levels on Ayondo and more
Wikifolio points on Wikifolio) tends to support overconfidence. However, the platform-specific rating and
incentive frameworks can influence the way signalers react. The strict limits concerning the maximum
drawdown and performance requirements on Ayondo can reduce the overconfidence of trade leaders and
might lead to more rational behavior. Signalers do not wish to risk an expulsion to the base level, in
particular if they have already achieved a higher position. Not having the option to open a new portfolio
emphasizes the effect. Since Wikifolio points are calculated on a daily basis allowing signalers to move up
2A trader may, for instance, pursue a strategy close to that of an arbitrageur between an stock index future and the
underlying index, forcing him or her to trade a lot. If carried out rationally, though, the strategy should still be so profitable
that at least the accruing transactions costs are earned and no negative expected returns emerge as a result from the strategy.
However, the generally higher level of trading activity must be accounted for as it is not an expression of overconfidence.
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and down the grading scale at any time, we expect that, contrary to Ayondo, the Wikifolio rating scheme
will rather foster overconfident behavior. The platform has also not implemented rebalancing measures
such as risk limiting mechanisms, which could reduce irrational trading activity. This effect is reinforced
by the option of opening several wikifolios.
Hypothesis 3 The platform-specific rating and incentive features influence the trading activity in a dif-
ferent manner.
4 Data and methodology
4.1 Data
We use a comprehensive data set that enables us to measure the relationship between financial activities
and social interaction on two major social trading platforms in Germany. The setting of the platforms
offers the possibility to simultaneously observe trading activity and individual behavior.
Both platforms publish historical time series of individual trading and performance data on their websites.
We downloaded individual daily trading data from Ayondo and Wikifolio during the observation period of
November 2015 to May 2016. The dataset includes all portfolios created on Ayondo ever since April 2009
and all portfolios created on Wikifolio ever since September 2011. Furthermore, we manually collected
additional information on social interaction such as the number of followers or Wikifolio points on a weekly
basis. The dataset employed is similar to but more comprehensive than the dataset utilized by Dorfleitner
et al. (2018).
Since the platforms are open to everyone and entry prerequisites are loose, the customer base includes
both novices and experts. We adjust the data set by excluding both the demo and inactive accounts
to reduce possible biases. Some deficient observations on Ayondo with a maximum drawdown exceeding
100% are deleted. With respect to Wikifolio, we concentrate on the wikifolios that are published and
eligible for investment. Finally, we arrive at a data set containing 15,654 weekly performance observations
of 1,284 signalers on Ayondo and 106,634 weekly return observations of 4,504 wikifolios of 2,716 signalers
on Wikifolio. While some portfolios were created during the observation period, others existed previously,
sometimes for months or years. Consequently, the dataset also features traders who do not have any
investors yet. Our data do not suffer from survivorship bias, as both the successful and less successful
portfolios are retained in the dataset. The platforms disclose information on the trading and social activity
of each signaler starting from the beginning of their membership. While Ayondo supplies extensive metric
data, Wikifolio provides an insight into quality indicators such as the relationship between risk and return,
the traded instruments, and trading style, by using so-called tags to categorize wikifolios. We therefore
expect – due to disparities in the availability of information as well as in the platform design – Ayondo
and Wikifolio to attract different trader and investor groups. Additionally, we assume that the likelihood
of errors in the data points is minimal since platform operators advertise the transparency of information
and high data quality.
To quantify the returns we follow the platforms, which display the figure Total performance as the main
performance indicator of trading strategies measuring the performance of the signal provider since the
creation of the portfolio to the corresponding day. Weekly performance (Return) is calculated based
on the relative difference in Total performance between the week under consideration and the previous
one. To avoid spurious results due to weekend effects, we construct our performance variable on the
interval between one Wednesday and the next. Since daily performance figures are not retrievable for
7
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every single portfolio, we interpolate performance data on Ayondo and search externally for corresponding
prices for wikifolios3. Note that the variable Return already accounts for transaction costs4. As suggested
by Hypothesis 1, we include the popularity of a signaler – measured by the numbers of followers or
net cash flows respectively (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Apart from this we consider the ranking of trade
leaders to investigate Hypothesis 3. We measure the current Level of a trader on Ayondo as well as
Wikifolio points at the end of one week. In order to control for the effects of the market on returns,
we include Benchmark returns, obtained from Yahoo Finance. We follow a similar approach to Sharpe
(1992) and apply asset-specific benchmarks. We account for the focus on trading with (CFDs on) stocks
and indices and utilize the return of the MSCI World index in Euro. Moreover, the variable V olatility
enters the model to measure risk exposure on performance. By adding lagged returns we account for
the past success of signalers. Finally, platform-specific risk and performance key figures as well as social
interaction variables i.e. the number of comments published in a week enter the regression. Table 1 and 2
provide a detailed description of all explanatory variables as well as additional control variables.
INSERT TABLE 1 AND 2 HERE
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Ayondo Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for our sample of 882 signalers on Ayondo in the obser-
vation period. As a consequence of trading with CFDs and the disproportional effect of price changes
on performance the weekly returns exhibit large variations. We account for the skewness of the return
distribution and winsorize weekly returns at the 1% and 99% levels leading to a minimum of −913.11%
and a maximum of 703.64%. The resulting average return amounts to −8.4%. In comparison, the mean
weekly benchmark performance is −0.33%. We conclude that, on average, signalers underperform the
benchmark. Regarding the hypotheses-related variable trades, we observe an average of 18 trades per
week. Some traders, though, appear to trade intensively, resulting in a maximum of 839 trades within
one week. The risk measure maximum drawdown adds to the presumption of extremely risky trading on
Ayondo with a mean of 19.7% and a maximum value of 99.87%. With respect to popularity, signalers have
an average of 31 followers. We interpret the skewed distribution as an indicator for herding as investors
merely appear to concentrate on a few signalers. An advanced skill level of a trader should be reflected
through a higher career level. In fact, the mean of 1.7 suggests that signalers stay in the region of the first
and second level. One explanation for this result could be the return of a trader to the initial level in the
case of exceeding the maximum drawdown.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Wikifolio Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the Wikifolio sample comprised of 4,370 wikifolios
among 2,670 signalers in the sample period. To begin with, the distribution of returns is skewed to the
right as in the case of Ayondo. However, as trading instruments are not restricted to CFDs, the leverage
effect in returns is reduced. Nonetheless, a minimum of −19.03% and a maximum of 13.33% is achieved
after winsorizing returns at the 1% and 99% levels. Signalers on Wikifolio generate, on average, weekly
returns of −0.12%. In comparison, the weekly performance of the benchmark ranges from −6.4% to 4.8%
with a mean of −0.07%. Consequently, the traders on Wikifolio appear to perform better than those
on Ayondo, although they still underperform the MSCI World Index. The volatility in returns exhibits
a mean of 0.0206 and a standard deviation of 0.0709. The positive skewness indicates extreme outliers.
3Interpolated values account for less than 1% of Ayondo performance data.
4While Ayondo incorporates transaction costs in the CFD spreads, transaction costs on Wikifolio are a part of the
replication strategy in the certificates and thus also already contained in the certificate prices.
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We observe an average trading activity of 5.4 trades per week. Consistent with the results on Ayondo, a
few signalers appear to trade extensively. The higher level in trading activity on Ayondo compared with
Wikifolio can be partially explained by the fact that Ayondo applies a volume-based performance model.
Concerning the popularity of wikifolios, the mean net capital change amounts to 110.947 Euro. While the
most successful wikifolio has thus far experienced a maximum of 19,421 Euro worth of net cash inflows, the
least favourable wikifolio experienced net cash flows of −14,853 Euro. Based on certain criteria, trading
strategies are awarded with Wikifolio points, that are spread between 0 and 8,514 with an average value
of 317. Table 5 provides insights into the relative frequency of the binary variables.
INSERT TABLE 4 AND 5 HERE
4.3 Methodology
Due to the two-dimensional structure of the data, we perform panel regressions to study our hypotheses.
We apply an approach similar to that of Jin et al. (2016) to quantify the relationship between weekly
performance (Return) and the trading activity (Trades). Since only negative returns after transaction
costs following increased trading activity initiated by irrational factors are a clear identification of over-
confidence, our model considers benchmark return, volatility, and platform-specific variables describing
the characteristics of the trading strategies. We follow Gervais and Odean (2001) and Glaser and Weber
(2010) and assume that overconfidence is not constant over time as it may be subject to fluctuations
conditioned by events that occur within the course of social trading. In light of the skewed distribution of
Trades and Followers we logarithmically transform the variables. Since this method is inappropriate for
Net capital change, we instead winsorize it at the 1% and 99% level to account for extreme outliers.
Traders differ in unobservable personal traits such as trading ability or the level of overconfidence and are
subject to the incentives imposed by the platform. Furthermore, the trading strategy has an impact on
the signaler’s general performance, risk taking and trading activity. All these factors give rise to possible
endogeneity issues (Heimer, 2016; Glaser and Risius, 2016; Dorfleitner et al., 2018). We therefore employ
fixed effects to account for the endogeneity arising from personal characteristics of traders as well as from
differences in trading strategies (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). In order to analyze the factors that influence
overconfidence and the traders’ returns, we implement a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model with fixed
effects in both stages. We include rational determinants of trading activity as control variables in the
estimation of overconfidence proxied by the part of trading activity that is induced by irrational factors.
Besides tackling the endogeneity issue, the instrumental variable (IV) method provides the opportunity
to measure the rational and the irrational influences on trading activity in a dynamic setting. In doing so,
we distinguish ourselves from existing overconfidence models.
When establishing our conceptual model, we build on behavioral finance literature in order to analyze the
irrational factors affecting overconfidence. To begin with, we include lagged variables of the number of
followers and net change in invested capital, respectively, as well as the previous rating as instruments
to investigate our hypotheses. We account for the different behavioral patterns induced by the platform-
specific features by including further variables. Ayondo’s incentive and rating system is designed with the
objective to mitigate excessive risk taking by the traders by imposing a limit on the maximum drawdown.
Therefore, the lagged values of the maximum drawdown are added as instrumental variables. In addition,
as overconfidence is associated with a higher inclination towards risk (Odean, 1998; Cheng, 2007), we
thereby analyze whether this holds for signalers on Ayondo. Considering the fact that past success may
stimulate a trader’s confidence (Barber and Odean, 2001b; Statman et al., 2006; O’Connell and Teo, 2009;
Dowling and Lucey, 2010; Puetz and Ruenzi, 2011; Hirshleifer, 2015), we incorporate past performance,
the lagged trades-won ratio on Ayondo as well as performance related tags on Wikifolio as IVs. Finally, we
9





























































Journal of Risk Finance
investigate whether the overconfidence of the traders on Ayondo changes over time, based on the experience
of the trader (Gervais and Odean, 2001; Glaser and Weber, 2010).
In view of the technical factors influencing trading activity and returns5, we include lagged variables of
leverage and short ratio on Ayondo as well as different Wikifolio tags following Dorfleitner et al. (2018).
Since traders on Wikifolio can comment on their trading activities, we also include the variable Comments
in our model to factor in the social network characteristics (Dorfleitner et al., 2018). We account for the re-
lationship between diversification and trading activity by encompassing the lagged Herfindahl-Hirschmann
index for Ayondo and the tag Diversified for Wikifolio. We also establish the variable Heavy trader as
control variable in the Wikifolio model.
As a result, the regression models for Ayondo and Wikifolio manifest the following structure, where i
represents the signaler and t denotes the time dimension. The terms εi,t and ϕi,t constitute the error
terms in the instrumental and reduced form equation respectively.
The Ayondo 2SLS model is represented by:
log(1 + Trades)i,t = π1 log(1 + Follower)i,t−1 + π2 Leveli,t−1 + π3 TWRi,t−1
+ π4MDDi,t−1 + π5Experiencei,t−1 + φ1Benchmarki,t + φ2 V olatilityi,t−1
+ φ3Returni,t−1 + φ4 Leveragei,t−1 + φ5 Shorti,t−1 + φ6HHIi,t−1
+ φ7Weekt + ηi + ϕi,t
(1)
Returni,t = γ1Benchmarki,t + γ2 V olatilityi,t−1 + γ3Returni,t−1 + γ4 Leveragei,t−1
+ γ5 Shorti,t−1 + γ6HHIi,t−1 + γ7Weekt + β1 log(1 + Trades)i,t + υi + εi,t
(2)
while the Wikifolio 2SLS model can be expressed as:
log(1 + Trades)i,t = π1 log(1 +Net capital change)i,t−1 + π2WF pointsi,t−1
+ π3Moneymanageri,t−1 + φ1Benchmarki,t + φ2 V olatilityi,t−1
+ φ3Returni,t−1 + φ4Commentsi,t + φ5Heavyi,t−1 + φ6 Performancei,t−1
+ φ7Bestselleri,t−1 + φ8Diversifiedi,t−1 + φ9Weekt + ηi + ϕi,t
(3)
Returni,t = γ1Benchmarki,t + γ2 V olatilityi,t−1 + γ3Returni,t−1 + γ4Commentsi,t + γ5Heavyi,t−1
+ γ6 Performancei,t−1 + γ7Bestselleri,t−1 + γ8Diversifiedi,t−1 + γ9Weekt
+ β1 log(1 + Trades)i,t + υi + εi,t
(4)
We use clustered standard errors at the signaler level and include the time variable Week to control for
the effects of time-series trends. Due to the fact that OLS estimates are likely to be more precise than
IV estimates, we check whether the application of the IV approach biases our results. The Hansen’s J
statistic and endogeneity tests confirm that the econometric estimation procedure satisfies the conditions
for efficiently estimating the effect of overconfidence on performance (Hansen and Singleton, 1982; James
H. Stock and Motohiro Yogo, 2005; Kleibergen and Paap, 2006; Baum et al., 2007).
5In comparison to other research such as the study of Oehler et al. (2016), we do not take the approach of applying factor
models to analyze returns, but instead base our analysis on the panel data structure and thus follow a rather Fama-MacBeth
style approach. By accounting for market returns we implicitly use a beta of 1. In addition, as we consider various influencing
factors of returns we do not consider it fruitful to implement additional risk factors.
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5 Results
In this section, we explore the relationship between performance and trading behavior on Ayondo and
Wikifolio. We analyze the factors that influence overconfidence with respect to our hypotheses and perform
robustness checks. Finally, we discuss the differences between both platforms.
5.1 Ayondo
Table 6 represents the 2SLS regression results with Return as the dependent variable. With respect to
the hypothesis-related variable Level, regression 1 includes dummy variables for the different career levels,
while regression 2 utilizes the continuous variable Leveli,t-1. To begin with, the auxiliary regression 1
provides an insight into the validity of the instruments for overconfidence (log(1+Trades)). As suggested
by hypothesis 1, the coefficient of the number of followers is positively significant at the 5% level. This
result indicates that popularity amongst investors stimulates the overconfidence of traders in their abilities
leading to an increase in trading activity. It needs to be noted that this finding is novel, since the
development of social trading platforms has introduced the social dimension of followers. In addition, this
information is made immediately available to the trade leaders and is able to influence their behavior in this
way. Regarding hypothesis 3, we find that the platform-specific ranking and incentive scheme significantly
affects trading behavior. The coefficients of the career levels 3 and 4 on Ayondo are positively significant
at the 10% level. However, the coefficient is insignificant for the highest level 5. The remuneration model
of Ayondo follows a volume-based approach directly aligning the signaler’s compensation to his or her
position in the platform ranking and the trading volume generated. Due to the fact that traders at a
higher level profit proportionally from more followers and the higher level, we interpret this finding as
being an indication of the fact that rational traders adapt their trading behavior accordingly. However,
the positive, significant coefficient demonstrates that higher positions in the league table tend to nourish
the signaler’s self-perception and nurture his or her overconfidence, leading to increased trading activity.
The insignificant coefficient of Level 5 can be explained by the fact that this career level entails the risk of
losing the most due to the irreversible drop to the entry level. The risk is further amplified by increased
trading activity, which, in turn, reduces returns by means of transaction costs. The negative and significant
effect of maximum drawdown on overconfidence can be explained by the fact that this figure constitutes
one of the main criteria for the assignment of the career level. Since exceeding the limited MDD of 25%
will result in an expulsion from the current level back to the initial position, the maximum drawdown
serves as a monitor for the level of risk taking. Therefore, the measure maximum drawdown reduces the
signalers’ propensity towards overconfidence. Looking at the combined effect of Level and MDD shows
that the impact of the risk requirement exceeds the positive effect of the rating on overconfidence, leading
to a joined negative effect of the ranking and incentive system. Concluding, our results suggest that the
ranking system on Ayondo is constructed in a way that mitigates overconfident behavior by making the
traders more rational.6
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
The positive development of the trades-won ratio predicts that the signaler will be more greatly exposed
to increased trading activity following past success. The coefficient of experience is negatively correlated
with overconfidence. With respect to the rational and trading-strategy-related factors affecting trading
activity, we find that high leverage ratios, representing the trader’s inclination towards risk, have an
6If we additionally control for the interaction of Level 1 and an MDD exceeding 25% (regression not reported here), we
observe an insignificant coefficient. Thus, there is no support for the view that those traders that are not anymore subject
to the risk limits trade more excessively.
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insignificant impact on trading activity. Traders whose strategies comprise fewer asset classes appear to
trade less extensively as compared with signalers who focus on a variety of instruments in their portfolios.
Additionally, the portfolio’s performance in the previous week is positively significant. Lastly, the week
dummies exhibit significant negative coefficients implying that traders reduce trading activity over time.
Finally, when analyzing the second stage regression 2, we find that the results support our hypothesis 2,
being that the trader’s performance is adversely affected by overconfidence. The negative and highly
significant coefficient of trading activity suggests that overconfident signalers, whose behavior is affected
by irrational factors, diminish their returns by trading too much. The interesting aspect in this finding is
the fact that overconfidence is still present after controlling for several technical aspects affecting trading
activity such as the portfolio concentration, past returns and their volatility as well as the portfolio’s
strategy. The irrational part of trading intensity can thus be explained by the social interaction dimensions
of followers and the rating and incentive scheme. Regarding the benchmark return, we find a negative
relationship between the development of the return of the MSCI World Index and a trader’s performance,
indicating a tendency amongst signalers to short the market. We assume that the insignificant coefficients
can be partly explained by the fact that a large part of the return variation due to the weekly market
variations is captured by the time dummy. Moreover, we discover a significant negative relationship
between past and current performance. Contrary to expectations, the results demonstrate an insignificant
risk-reward-relationship. What is more, the leverage and short ratio do not significantly affect social
trading returns, while the effect of the portfolio composition is significantly negative. With respect to
time series trends, we in fact observe a significant negative coefficient, indicating that signalers impair
their performance over time.
5.2 Wikifolio
The results of the 2SLS regression with Return as the dependent variable are reported in Table 7. The first
column shows the regressions containing the hypotheses-related variables Net capital change, WF Points
and Money manager. In the second regression the main model is extended by the instrumental variables
Loyal and Frequently. Starting with the first stage regression 3, we assess the validity of our instruments.
In line with hypothesis 1, the net capital change positively and significantly affects the degree of over-
confidence. These results indicate that subsequent to fund inflows, signalers become more overconfident
and trade more actively. The information on the popularity of a trader is displayed prominently and can
therefore impact a signaler’s behavior. As expected, we find that the ranking system on Wikifolio signifi-
cantly influences overconfidence, thereby confirming hypothesis 3. Just like on Ayondo, the coefficient of
Wikifolio points is positive. This finding implies that a promotion in the league table nourishes the signal
provider’s self-perception and fosters his or her overconfidence. Contrary to Ayondo, the Wikifolio ranking
does not impose a strict restriction on the further progress of the signalers. Since Wikifolio follows the
HWM-compensation approach, the incentive system appears to encourage excessive trading activity. The
option to open several wikifolios simultaneously adds to this expected behavior. Therefore, we conjecture
that the setup of the ranking and incentive system induces overconfident investors to continue in the same
manner, as setbacks do not have an educational character and means with a countervailing effect are not
in place. In the next step, we examine whether quality tags that indicate the popularity of a wikifolio
move overconfidence. We observe a significant positive effect of the reward Money manager and a slightly
positive effect of the tag Loyal investors on overconfidence.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
With respect to the effect of rational and trading-strategy-related factors on trading activity the results
demonstrate a negative significant relationship between benchmark returns and trading activity. Trade
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leaders appear to decrease their trading intensity following positive benchmark performances. Contrary
to Ayondo, past performance exhibits negative coefficients significant at the 10% level. Besides, we find
a negative, yet insignificant correlation between past volatility and trading activity. The number of
comments are not significantly related to trading activity. Wikifolio grants portfolios with awards based on
quality indicators, the relationship between risk and return, traded instruments and trading style. Among
these the tag Heavy trader exhibits a positive and significant coefficient, implying the persistence of high
trading activity. As is the case with Ayondo, we provide empirical evidence of the positive relationship
between past success in terms of risk-return-ratios and trading activity, which is displayed by the significant
coefficient of the tag High performance. Interestingly, we find that if a wikifolio has been amongst the
25 most frequently purchased strategies within the last two weeks (Bestseller), it has a positive, albeit
insignificant, effect on trading activity. Finally, trade leaders appear to reduce their trading activity over
time – as in the case of Ayondo.
The results from the second stage regression 4 add weight to hypothesis 2. The negative and signif-
icant coefficient of overconfidence proves that excessive trading by overconfident signalers on Wikifolio
reduces returns. We show that after accounting for the rational factors affecting trading activity, namely
benchmark returns and volatility of returns as well as the wikifolio characteristics, overconfidence leads to
increased trading activity. We provide evidence of the fact that the irrational part of trading intensity can,
thus, be explained through the soci l interaction features of followers and the rating and incentive scheme.
When taking into account that we already control for the tag Heavy trader, we show that overconfidence is
existent beyond this. Contrary to Ayondo, the benchmark return has a positive and significant coefficient.
There appears to be evidence of the fact that traders on Wikifolio tend to go long in the market. What is
more, past returns have a significant positive relationship with current returns. According to our results,
volatility has an insignificant negative effect on performance. Furthermore, since the number of posted
comments implies a decrease in social trading returns we assume that experts are more reluctant to com-
municate their trading strategies. Regarding the wikifolio tags, we do not observe significant effects on
social trading returns. Interestingly, the tag Heavy trader significantly positively affects a trader’s return.
Finally, the results indicate that signalers on Wikifolio also impair their performance over time.
5.3 Robustness checks
We conduct a series of robustness checks by establishing model variations and calculating the regressions
with different subsamples.
Subsample regressions Lastly, traders on Wikifolio decide, at the beginning of their career, whether or
not they wish to make use of leveraged products. We account for the high affinity to risk of overconfident
traders and analyze overconfidence of those signalers that include leveraged products in their wikifolios
(Odean, 1998). In this setting, we can confirm all three hypotheses. We observe that the coefficients of
the hypotheses related variables Net capital change and WF points slightly increase in size (see Table 7
models 3–4). However, one has to keep in mind that the traders do not actually have to trade this type of
securities during the observation period. One could argue that our results are biased towards extremely
active traders. We thus form subsamples by focusing on the active traders who traded in the previous
week (see Table 6 models 3–4 and Table 7 models 5–6). We observe almost identical results for the
active subsample compared to the original sample in the case of Ayondo. The main difference lies in the
insignificance of the coefficient of Level 3. When considering the Wikifolio subsample of active traders, the
coefficients of the hypotheses related variables increase slightly in size, while the effect of trading activity
on returns is slightly reduced. The effects of past returns and the tag Heavy trader become insignificant.
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Model variations We follow Dorfleitner et al. (2018) and use the performance of the German stock
index (DAX 30) as an alternative measure of benchmark performance to capture possible market and
timing effects. In addition, we use USD/EUR return as a benchmark for Ayondo due to the extensive
use of forex trading. For both platforms, our results provide evidence for our hypotheses (see Table 6
models 5–8 and Table 7 models 7–8). Finally, we winsorize the number of comments at the 1% and 99%
level to incorporate the skewness of the distribution. Due to the marginal differences in comparison to the
main models, we do not report the results here. Altogether, our results substantiate that our indication
of overconfidence, namely the irrational part of trading activity, instrumented by a set of variables to
account for several dimensions of overconfidence and resulting in negative returns, is a predictive factor
for performance and appropriately accounts for endogeneity.
6 Conclusion
To date, extensive research has indicated that investors are subject to behavioral and social biases. In this
article we analyze aspects of trading behavior on two major social trading platforms in Germany, namely
Ayondo and Wikifolio. In particular, we investigate the factors influencing the overconfidence contingent
on social interaction features. In contrast to existing overconfidence studies, our data stem from a world
external to the laboratory setting. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explore how these novel
dimensions of online trading impact on overconfidence. We apply a fixed effects two-stage least squares
approach to resolve endogeneity issues and confirm our results following a series of robustness checks. By
using an exclusive dataset from two leading social trading platforms, we gain insights into the influence of
the heterogenous business models. We sustain novel and, to some extent, surprising conclusions.
Above all, we add to behavioral finance research by providing evidence of the negative relationship between
overconfidence, proxied by the irrational part of trading activity, and social trading returns in this innova-
tive online trading environment. The negative returns after transaction costs indicate that the increased
trading intensity triggered by irrational factors can actually be unequivocally identified as overconfidence.
Considering the magnitude of the effect, we find that the coefficient of the endogenous variable is larger
in absolute value on Ayondo than on Wikifolio. The difference in trading activity on both platforms could
account for this finding. As proven by the IV estimation, there are various irrational factors on the plat-
forms that are significantly related to overconfidence. The signaler’s popularity, either measured by the
number of followers or the net change in invested capital, reveals itself to be a significant driver of irrational
behavior on both platforms. Hence, we conclude that the overconfidence of the traders increases when they
receive more attention from the network, as they attribute capital inflows to their abilities. This finding is
particularly intriguing as the business model of the platforms is geared to attracting followers.The benefits
for investors of investing in sophisticated traders are, to some extent, reduced by the inverse effect of a
growing quantity of followers on the overconfidence of signalers. We identify that the platform-specific
ranking and incentive system is a significant driver of overconfidence. In general, we find that the rat-
ing system nurtures the trade leader’s overconfidence. A clear difference is evidenced by the strict risk
limits and drop out consequences on Ayondo, which have a significant countervailing effect on excessive
trading. On the contrary, the HWM remuneration approach on Wikifolio combined with less prohibitive
measures regarding the progression in the rating do not mitigate overconfident behavior. Moreover, we
provide insights into the relationship of several factors such as risk, experience and past success with the
degree of overconfidence. Taken together, the different frameworks of the platforms motivate heterogenous
behavioral responses by the signalers.
Our findings are relevant from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. On the one hand, platform
operators aim to attract successful traders, who will in turn entice followers, consequently increasing the
14
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operators’ revenues. On the other hand, we have proven that the social feedback characteristics can lead
to more pronounced overconfidence compared with the standard market setting. Since the overconfident
traders experience reduced returns, they may deter prospective customers from joining the platform.
Specifically, the more restrictive rating system can be of an advantage for platforms in guiding trader
behavior. Even more so, platform operators should be aware of how the monitoring mechanisms and
incentives of the platform affect their business models. Investors can refer to our findings when choosing
the platform that matches their preferences. Due to the fact that the return of investors is equally affected
by the performance of the underlying assets and the behavior of the trader, gaining greater insight into
the behavior of signalers can help followers in forming their portfolios.
A limitation of our research lies in the fact that due to lack of data availability, only a few control
variables can be used in assessing overconfidence on Wikifolio. The incorporation of additional metric
variables would allow us to capture supplementary factors. To improve the generalizability of our findings,
future research could investigate additional platforms that differ in products offered, incentive systems,
interaction mechanisms, specifically since we demonstrate that the different platform designs shape the
behavior of the traders. Summarizing, we expect increasing digitization combined with changes in the
regulatory environment to affect the development of social trading platforms. In conclusion, our article
contributes to an improved understanding of the phenomenon of social trading.
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Table 1: Definition of the explanatory variables on Ayondo
Data sources: Own calculations based on data from Ayondo and Yahoo Finance. Description of variables following Ayondo
(2016).
Variable Meaning Description
Returni,t Weekly return Performance of a trader’s portfolio in week t,
calculated as being the ratio of the weekly net total
performance to the previous week’s total performance
Benchmarki,t Benchmark return Weekly return of the MSCI World Index (in Euro)
V olatilityi,t Volatility Volatility of daily returns over the last 4 weeks
Tradesi,t Trades per week Number of trades a trader executed in week t
TWRi,t Trades-won ratio Ratio of all previous trades that have been closed with
a winning position
Followeri,t Number of followers Number of followers following a trader’s portfolio
measured on a weekly basis
MDDi,t Maximum drawdown Maximum drawdown a trader has ever experienced
since the beginning of the observation period
Leveragei,t Leverage r tio Average leverage of all trades during the previous week





Sum of squared portfolio allocations to a specific asset
class according to Hoffmann and Shefrin (2011)
Leveli,t Career level Career level of the trader in categorical values ranging
from 1 to 5 (Street Trader, Advanced, Professional,
Risk-adjusted, Institutional)
Experiencei,t Experience Trading experience of the trader in categorical values
ranging from 0 to 6 (0 years, 0-1, 1-2, 2-5, 5-10, more
than 10 years)
Week dummyt Week Binary, time identifying variable indicating the week of
measurement
16
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Table 2: Definition of the explanatory variables on Wikifolio




Returni,t Weekly return Performance of a trader’s portfolio in week t, calculated as
being the ratio of the weekly net total performance to the
previous week’s total performance
Benchmarki,t Benchmark return Weekly return of the MSCI World Index (in Euro)
V olatilityi,t Volatility Volatility of daily returns over the last 4 weeks
Tradesi,t Trades per week Number of trades a trader executed in week t, measured in
multiples of 5
Net capital changei,t Net change in invested capital Difference between the total capital invested in the current and
in the previous week accounting for capital changes following
positive returns
Commentsi,t Number of comments Number of published comments by the trader in week t,
measured in multiples of 5
WF pointsi,t Wikifolio points Wikifolio points of the trader in the respective week
Week dummyt Week Time identifying variable indicating the week of measurement
Wikifolio tags (binary variables)
Money_manageri,t Good money manager Good money managers accomplished a mean monthly return
exceeding 0.3% during a time interval of 6-24 months, while at
the same time experiencing losses above 20% of the portfolio
value. In addition, the trader executed more than 35 trades.
Loyali,t Loyal investors More than 15 buy orders have been placed on the wikifolio
during the preceding 24 months. In addition, the ratio of sale
transactions to total transactions is below 35%.
Frequentlyi,t Frequently bought The difference in the number of purchase requests and sale
requests since the emission of the index certificate is higher
than 25.
Heavy traderi,t Heavy trader Within the last 49 days, at least 7 times the aggregated
portfolio value has been turned around by the trader.
Performancei,t High performance The portfolio with the status "published" or "investable"
achieved a performance of more than 40% in the preceding 12
months and a mean return of more than 4% in the last 6
months.
Bestselleri,t Bestseller The index certificate on the wikifolio has been purchased more
often than sold within the last two weeks. Furthermore, it is
amongst the 25 most highly purchased wikifolios on the
platform during the past 14 days.
Diversifiedi,t Actively diversified These types of wikifolios have invested in at least 10 different
securities in the last 6 weeks, of which none comprise for more
than one fifth of the portfolio value.
Leveragedi,t Trades leveraged products The wikifolio can include structured products.
17
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics Ayondo
Notes: Descriptive statistics of the Ayondo dataset consisting of 9,522 observations of 882 signalers for the observation pe-
riod from November 13th 2015 to May 20th 2016. This table contains means and standard deviations (STD) of the variables.
Min./Max. refer to the minimum/maximum values of the variables. The variables are defined in Table 1.
Variable N Min. Mean Max. SD
Returni,t 9,365 −9.1311 −0.0840 7.0364 1.5544
Benchmarki,t 9,365 −0.0629 −0.0033 0.0477 0.0290
Benchmark_USD/EURi,t 9,365 −0.0289 −0.0007 0.0247 0.0134
Benchmark_DAX i,t 9,365 −0.0623 0.0046 0.0606 0.0338
V olatilityi,t 9,365 0.0107 2.1661 1, 664.6800 24.6133
Tradesi,t 9,365 0.0000 17.7368 839.0000 37.1474
log(1 + Trades)i,t 9,365 0.0000 2.0682 6.7334 1.2905
Followeri,t 9,365 0.0000 30.9247 2, 165.0000 191.4300
log(1 + Follower)i,t 9,365 0.0000 0.9679 7.8876 1.5015
Leveli,t 9,365 1.0000 1.6711 5.0000 1.0319
MDDi,t 9,365 0.0000 19.7061 99.8760 24.3581
TWRi,t 9,365 0.0000 0.6209 1.0000 0.3426
Leveragei,t 9,365 0.8000 23.5187 200.0000 37.8622
Shorti,t 9,365 0.0000 0.4277 1.0000 0.3490
HHI i,t 9,365 0.0000 0.8982 1.0000 0.2023
Experiencei,t 9,365 0.0000 1.7923 5.0000 2.2120
18
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics Wikifolio
Notes: Descriptive statistics of the Wikifolio dataset consisting of 87,128 observations of 4,370 wikifolios of 2,670 signalers
for the observation period from November 13th 2015 to May 20th 2016. This table contains means and standard deviations
(STD) of the variables. Min./Max. refer to the minimum/maximum values of the variables. The variables are defined in
Table 2.
Variable N Min. Mean Max. SD
Returni,t 87,031 −0.1903 −0.0012 0.1333 0.0396
Benchmarki,t 87,031 −0.0643 −0.0007 0.0483 0.0279
Benchmark_DAX i,t 87,031 −0.0832 −0.0013 0.0467 0.0316
V olatilityi,t 87,031 0.0000 0.0206 7.1166 0.0709
Tradesi,t 87,031 0.0000 5.4017 1, 265.0000 26.3591
log(1 + Trades)i,t 87,031 0.0000 0.6110 7.1436 1.1750
Net capital changei,t 87,031 −14, 853.0000 110.9747 19, 421.0000 3, 014.0000
WF pointsi,t 87,031 0.0000 317.3683 8, 514.0000 690.5921
Commentsi,t 87,031 0.0000 43.8605 2, 275.0000 109.1601
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of binary variables on Wikifolio
Notes: Descriptive statistics of the Wikifolio dataset consisting of 87,128 observations of 4,370 wikifolios of 2,670 signalers
for the observation period from November 13th 2015 to May 20th 2016. This table contains absolute and relative frequencies
of the binary variables. *Relative frequency of the variable Leverage refers to the overall dataset. The variables are defined
in Table 2.
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Table 6: 2SLS regression of Returni,t on trading activity – Ayondo
Notes: This table presents the results of a two-stage least squares fixed effects regression estimating the relationship between
Returni,t and trading activity (log(1 + Trades)i,t), instrumented by a set of instrumental variables on Ayondo. Returni,t is
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. While model 1 uses dummy variables for the different Levels, model 2 utilizes Level
as a continuous variable to measure the effect of rating on trading activity. Models 3 to 4 constitute robustness checks and
focus on a subsample of active signalers who have been trading in the previous week. Models 5 to 6 and models 7 to 8 use
USD/EUR returns and DAX returns respectively as market returns to investigate the robustness of the regression results.
Table 1 provides detailed descriptions of all variables used throughout the study. The standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the signaler level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
First stage regression: estimation of the endogenous variable log(1 + Trades)i,t
log(1 + Follower)i,t-1 0.0618** 0.0624** 0.0504* 0.0512** 0.0618** 0.0624** 0.0618** 0.0624**
(0.027 6) (0.025 8) (0.027 8) (0.025 8) (0.027 6) (0.025 8) (0.027 6) (0.025 8)
Level_2i,t-1 0.0852 0.0670 0.0852 0.0852
(0.056 6) (0.057 9) (0.056 6) (0.056 6)
Level_3i,t-1 0.170** 0.142 0.170** 0.170**
(0.085 5) (0.089 4) (0.085 5) (0.085 5)
Level_4i,t-1 0.225* 0.240* 0.225* 0.225*
(0.122 ) (0.127 ) (0.122 ) (0.122 )
Level_5i,t-1 0.170 0.177 0.170 0.170
(0.235 ) (0.202 ) (0.235 ) (0.235 )
Leveli,t-1 0.0779** 0.0713* 0.0779** 0.0779**
(0.037 3) (0.039 0) (0.037 3) (0.037 3)
MDDi,t-1 −0.016*** −0.016*** −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.016*** −0.016*** −0.016*** −0.016***
(0.002 9) (0.002 9) (0.003 0) (0.003 0) (0.002 9) (0.002 9) (0.002 9) (0.002 9)
TWRi,t-1 0.368*** 0.368*** 0.375*** 0.375*** 0.368*** 0.368*** 0.368*** 0.368***
(0.041 2) (0.041 2) (0.046 5) (0.046 4) (0.041 2) (0.041 2) (0.041 2) (0.041 2)
Experiencei,t-1 −0.0004 −0.0005 −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0004 −0.0005 −0.0004 −0.0005
(0.001 1) (0.001 1) (0.001 2) (0.001 2) (0.001 1) (0.001 1) (0.001 1) (0.001 1)
Benchmarki,t-1 −0.501 −0.492 −0.515 −0.510
(1.683 ) (1.684 ) (1.787 ) (1.789 )
Benchmark_USD/EURi,t-1 −5.101 −5.008
(17.13) (17.14)
Benchmark_DAX i,t-1 −1.166 −1.144
(3.915 ) (3.916 )
V olatilityi,t-1 −0.0004 −0.0005 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0005 −0.0005 −0.0005 −0.0005
(0.000 5) (0.000 5) (0.000 7) (0.000 7) (0.000 5) (0.000 5) (0.000 5) (0.000 5)
Returni,t-1 0.0107* 0.0106* 0.0104 0.0104 0.0107* 0.0106* 0.0107* 0.0106*
(0.006 2) (0.006 2) (0.006 4) (0.006 4) (0.006 2) (0.006 2) (0.006 2) (0.006 2)
Leveragei,t-1 0.0013 0.0013 0.0007 0.0008 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
(0.001 0) (0.001 0) (0.001 1) (0.001 1) (0.001 0) (0.001 0) (0.001 0) (0.001 0)
Shorti,t-1 0.0193 0.0186 −0.0226 −0.0239 0.0193 0.0186 0.0193 0.0186
(0.035 6) (0.035 7) (0.040 6) (0.040 7) (0.035 6) (0.035 7) (0.035 6) (0.035 7)
HHI i,t-1 −0.483*** −0.482*** −0.429*** −0.430*** −0.483*** −0.482*** −0.483*** −0.482***
(0.075 8) (0.075 9) (0.075 1) (0.075 0) (0.075 8) (0.075 9) (0.075 8) (0.075 9)
Week dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Second stage regression: estimation of the exogenous variable Returni,t with log(1 + Trades)i,t instrumented
log(1 + Trades)i,t −0.806*** −0.806*** −0.801*** −0.796*** −0.806*** −0.806*** −0.806*** −0.806***
(0.131 ) (0.132 ) (0.149 ) (0.150 ) (0.131 ) (0.132 ) (0.131 ) (0.132 )
Benchmarki,t-1 −4.574 −4.574 −4.335 −4.331
(2.830 ) (2.830 ) (3.063 ) (3.059 )
Benchmark_USD/EURi,t-1 −46.56 −46.56
(28.80) (28.81)
Benchmark_DAX i,t-1 −10.64 −10.64
(6.581 ) (6.582 )
V olatilityi,t-1 −0.0002 −0.0002 −9.95×10−5 −9.90×10−5 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002
(0.000 3) (0.000 3) (0.000 5) (0.000 5) (0.000 3) (0.000 3) (0.000 3) (0.000 3)
Returni,t-1 −0.081*** −0.081*** −0.081*** −0.081*** −0.081*** −0.081*** −0.081*** −0.081***
(0.013 8) (0.013 8) (0.014 7) (0.014 7) (0.013 8) (0.013 8) (0.013 8) (0.013 8)
Leveragei,t-1 0.0025 0.0025 0.0018 0.0018 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
(0.001 9) (0.001 9) (0.001 8) (0.001 8) (0.001 9) (0.001 9) (0.001 9) (0.001 9)
Shorti,t-1 0.0074 0.0074 −0.0003 −0.0002 0.0074 0.0074 0.0074 0.0074
(0.061 5) (0.061 5) (0.070 0) (0.070 0) (0.061 5) (0.061 5) (0.061 5) (0.061 5)
HHI i,t-1 −0.438*** −0.439*** −0.424*** −0.422*** −0.438*** −0.439*** −0.438*** −0.439***
(0.138 ) (0.138 ) (0.145 ) (0.145 ) (0.138 ) (0.138 ) (0.138 ) (0.138 )
Week dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hansen J statistic 5.39 3.65 8.03 6.49 5.39 3.65 5.39 3.65
p− value 0.61 0.45 0.33 0.17 0.61 0.45 0.61 0.46
Endogeneity test 51.77 48.57 39.89 35.87 51.77 48.57 51.77 48.57
p− value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 9,365 9,365 8,327 8,327 9,365 9,365 9,365 9,365
Number of signalers 882 882 810 810 882 882 882 882
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Table 7: 2SLS regression of Returni,t on trading activity – Wikifolio
Notes: This table presents the results of a two-stage least squares fixed effects regression estimating the relationship between
Returni,t and trading activity (log(1 + Trades)i,t), instrumented by a set of instrumental variables on Wikifolio. Returni,t
is winsorized at the 1% and 99% level and Net capital changei,t is calculated following Sirri and Tufano (1998). Model 1 rep-
resents the core model and is extended by additional social interaction variables in model 2. Models 3 to 4 and models 5 to
6 constitute robustness checks and focus on a subsample of wikifolios trading leveraged products and a subsample of active
traders who have been trading in the previous week, respectively. Models 7 to 8 use DAX returns as market return to in-
vestigate the robustness of the regression results. Table 2 provides detailed descriptions of all variables used throughout the
study. The standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the signaler level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
First stage regression: estimation of the endogenous variable log(1 + Trades)i,t
Net capital changei,t-1 6.70×10−6*** 6.66×10−6*** 1.04×10−5*** 1.03×10−5*** 8.20×10−6*** 8.15×10−6*** 6.70×10−6*** 6.66×10−6***
(1.23×10−6) (1.23×10−6) (2.13×10−6) (2.12×10−6) (1.80×10−6) (1.79×10−6) (1.23×10−6) (1.23×10−6)
WF pointsi,t-1 5.00×10−5*** 5.05×10−5*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 6.14×10−5*** 6.21×10−5*** 5.00×10−5*** 5.05×10−5***
(1.19×10−5) (1.19×10−5) (3.08×10−5) (3.13×10−5) (1.98×10−5) (1.98×10−5) (1.19×10−5) (1.19×10−5)
Moneymanageri,t-1 0.0650** 0.0641** 0.113 0.112 0.0738 0.0742 0.0650** 0.0641**
(0.027 1) (0.027 1) (0.071 5) (0.070 8) (0.058 1) (0.058 3) (0.027 1) (0.027 1)
Loyali,t-1 0.0996* 0.157 0.0009 0.0996*
(0.060 4) (0.096 8) (0.075 1) (0.060 4)
Frequentlyi,t-1 −0.0896 −0.168 −0.0408 −0.0896
(0.110 ) (0.181 ) (0.131 ) (0.110 )
Benchmarki,t-1 −3.280*** −3.275*** −5.044*** −5.029*** −9.127*** −9.122***
(0.725 ) (0.725 ) (1.515 ) (1.516 ) (2.902 ) (2.902 )
Benchmark_DAX i,t-1 0.224 0.212
(1.707 ) (1.707 )
V olatilityi,t-1 −0.0543 −0.0552 −0.0610 −0.0625 −0.0934 −0.0933 −0.0543 −0.0552
(0.045 8) (0.045 5) (0.047 2) (0.046 8) (0.071 4) (0.071 2) (0.045 8) (0.045 5)
Returni,t-1 −0.197* −0.196* −0.145 −0.143 0.150 0.147 −0.197* −0.196*
(0.110 ) (0.110 ) (0.159 ) (0.159 ) (0.222 ) (0.222 ) (0.110 ) (0.110 )
Commentsi,t 0.0008 0.0008 −6.84×10−5 −1.53×10−5 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008
(0.000 8) (0.000 8) (0.001 3) (0.001 3) (0.000 9) (0.000 9) (0.000 8) (0.000 8)
Heavyi,t-1 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.293*** 0.294*** 0.0539 0.0544 0.256*** 0.256***
(0.038 7) (0.038 6) (0.053 6) (0.053 2) (0.053 5) (0.053 5) (0.038 7) (0.038 6)
Performancei,t-1 0.377*** 0.373*** 0.427*** 0.416*** 0.352*** 0.350*** 0.377*** 0.373***
(0.080 7) (0.079 7) (0.110 ) (0.107 ) (0.105 ) (0.104 ) (0.080 7) (0.079 7)
Bestselleri,t-1 0.107 0.0987 0.115 0.104 0.117 0.126 0.107 0.0987
(0.089 1) (0.087 8) (0.146 ) (0.149 ) (0.112 ) (0.112 ) (0.089 1) (0.087 8)
Diversifiedi,t-1 0.0135 0.0137 0.0535 0.0547 0.0440 0.0442 0.0135 0.0137
(0.023 3) (0.023 3) (0.049 0) (0.049 0) (0.053 1) (0.053 1) (0.023 3) (0.023 3)
Week dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Second stage regression: estimation of the exogenous variable Returni,t with log(1 + Trades)i,t instrumented
log(1 + Trades)i,t −0.0366*** −0.0320*** −0.0339*** −0.0266*** −0.0274*** −0.0256*** −0.0366*** −0.0320***
(0.007 0) (0.007 0) (0.008 9) (0.009 1) (0.008 8) (0.008 6) (0.007 0) (0.007 0)
Benchmarki,t-1 0.496*** 0.511*** 0.222* 0.260** −0.250 −0.234
(0.047 8) (0.046 0) (0.119 ) (0.116 ) (0.179 ) (0.175 )
Benchmark_DAX i,t-1 0.262*** 0.262***
(0.102 ) (0.098 0)
V olatilityi,t-1 −0.0059 −0.0056 −0.0072 −0.0067 −0.0011 −0.0009 −0.0059 −0.0056
(0.005 3) (0.005 2) (0.005 5) (0.005 3) (0.003 5) (0.003 4) (0.005 3) (0.005 2)
Returni,t-1 0.0256*** 0.0270*** 0.0159 0.0181 0.001 98 0.002 02 0.0255*** 0.0269***
(0.0100 (0.009 8) (0.014 7) (0.014 2) (0.020 7) (0.020 6) (0.010 0) (0.009 8)
Commentsi,t −3.33×10−5 −3.83×10−5 −9.28×10−5 −9.57×10−5* −4.18×10−5 −4.36×10−5 −3.31×10−5 −3.82×10−5
(3.62×10−5) (3.33×10−5) (6.31×10−5) (5.60×10−5) (3.79×10−5) (3.67×10−5) (3.62×10−5) (3.33×10−5)
Heavyi,t-1 0.0084*** 0.0072*** 0.0103** 0.0082** 0.0013 0.0012 0.0083*** 0.0072***
(0.002 7) (0.002 7) (0.004 1) (0.004 1) (0.002 6) (0.002 6) (0.002 7) (0.002 7)
Performancei,t-1 −0.0016 −0.0034 0.0035 1.59×10−5 −0.0006 −0.0013 −0.0016 −0.0034
(0.006 1) (0.005 8) (0.008 2) (0.007 8) (0.008 0) (0.007 8) (0.006 1) (0.005 8)
Bestselleri,t-1 −0.0077 −0.0086* −0.0179** −0.0196** −0.0142* −0.0147* −0.0077 −0.0086*
(0.005 2) (0.005 0) (0.009 1) (0.008 9) (0.007 6) (0.007 6) (0.005 2) (0.005 0)
Diversifiedi,t-1 0.0005 0.0005 0.0021 0.0017 0.0014 0.0014 0.0005 0.0005
(0.001 0) (0.000 9) (0.002 0) (0.001 8) (0.002 0) (0.002 0) (0.001 0) (0.000 9)
Week dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hansen J statistic 1.80 7.24 0.42 6.89 1.52 3.09 1.80 7.22
p− value 0.41 0.12 0.81 0.14 0.47 0.54 0.41 0.12
Endogeneity test 106.35 100.37 28.99 24.96 22.09 22.41 106.13 100.19
p− value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 87,031 87,031 22,435 22,435 13,097 13,097 87,031 87,031
Number of wikifolios 4,370 4,370 1,181 1,181 1,461 1,461 4,370 4,370
Number of signalers 2,670 2,670 970 970 1,144 1,144 2,670 2,670
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